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Readiness potentialThe neural mechanisms underlying the spontaneous, stimulus-independent emergence of intentions and
decisions to act are poorly understood. Using a neurobiologically realistic model of frontal and temporal
areas of the brain, we simulated the learning of perception–action circuits for speech and hand-related
actions and subsequently observed their spontaneous behaviour. Noise-driven accumulation of reverber-
ant activity in these circuits leads to their spontaneous ignition and partial-to-full activation, which we
interpret, respectively, as model correlates of action intention emergence and action decision-and-execu-
tion. Importantly, activity emerged ﬁrst in higher-association prefrontal and temporal cortices, subse-
quently spreading to secondary and ﬁnally primary sensorimotor model-areas, hence reproducing the
dynamics of cortical correlates of voluntary action revealed by readiness-potential and verb-generation
experiments. This model for the ﬁrst time explains the cortical origins and topography of endogenous
action decisions, and the natural emergence of functional specialisation in the cortex, as mechanistic con-
sequences of neurobiological principles, anatomical structure and sensorimotor experience.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Voluntary action and the ability it entails to decide whether,
how, and when to act is a most essential feature of humans. In con-
trast to responses triggered by an external stimulus, the anteced-
ents of voluntary action lie entirely in internal cognitive
processes whose neurobiological underpinnings are poorly under-
stood. Regardless of whether the laws that govern what can be
considered free decisions – e.g., deciding whether and when to lift
a ﬁnger, whether to utter a word and which – are causally deter-
mined in a strict sense or rather probabilistic in nature, it is impor-
tant to delineate the cortical mechanisms underlying such self-
initiated decisions, asking how in the brain the ‘‘birth’’ of a thought
carrying an intention to speak or act (‘‘action thought’’ or ‘‘action
intention’’ for short) might occur. No explanation currently exists
for such spontaneous thoughts emergence. Ideally, such an expla-
nation should be provided in terms of a mechanistic model based
exclusively on neurobiological principles, and should elucidate
why the brain correlates of action intentions tend to arise ﬁrst
within a speciﬁc set of cortical areas and then subsequently spread
to others, as experimentally observed (see below). We provide one
such explanatory account here. The present model also offers theﬁrst neurobiologically based account of the emergence of func-
tional specialisation in the human brain, illustrating the precise
neural mechanisms by means of which speciﬁc cortical areas
may spontaneously ‘‘take on’’ speciﬁc cognitive processes, such
as planning and decision making.
Several studies have addressed aspects of the problem of spon-
taneous emergence of action thoughts. When subjects choose
freely the time point of a pre-deﬁned action (typically a button
press), a so-called ‘‘readiness potential’’ (RP) or ‘‘Bereitschaftspoten-
tial’’ emerges (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Shibasaki & Hallett,
2006), whose cortical generators can be localised. More precisely,
converging evidence from single-unit studies in the monkey (Romo
& Schultz, 1987), neurometabolic imaging studies in man (Wiese
et al., 2004) and epicortical recordings in patients (Ikeda & Shiba-
saki, 2003) enable the identiﬁcation of plausible RP cortical sources
in terms of a cascade of activations, starting in anterior prefrontal
areas at about 1–1.5 s before movement onset and proceeding ros-
tro-caudally, as follows: (1) initial (bilateral) activity in prefrontal
cortex, putatively underlying the emergence of an intention to
act, followed by (2) sources in supplementary motor and dorsal
premotor areas, leading to (3) lateralised activation in dorsolateral
(hand-speciﬁc) primary motor cortex (Haggard, 2008). Similar re-
sults have been found by studies investigating the origins of the
RP preceding speech (Deecke, Engel, Lang, & Kornhuber, 1986;
McArdle, Mari, Pursley, Schulz, & Braun, 2009), with cortical gener-
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movements, i.e., in inferior prefrontal, adjacent premotor, and
articulatory (mouth-speciﬁc) primary motor areas. Together, these
results suggest the existence of (at least) two parallel systems for
the planning and execution of voluntary movement (see red-
shaded areas in Fig. 1, panels A-B): (i) one for speech, located in
the prefrontal (PF), premotor (PM) and primary motor (M1) corti-
ces of the inferior frontal gyrus Fig. 1A; and (ii) one for hand and
ﬁnger movements, involving the dorsolateral parts of the middle
and ventrolateral parts of the superior frontal gyri Fig. 1B.Fig. 1. Brain areas, model architecture, and connectivity. (A)-(B) Sets of cortical area
movements and resultant sounds – that is, primary auditory cortex, labelled A1 (Brodm
motor, or M1 (ventral part of BA 4), premotor, or PM (ventral BA 6 and BA 44) and prefro
visual, or V1 (BA 17), temporo-occipital, or TO (including ventral parts of the occipital lob
anterior-temporal, or AT (including the temporal pole, BA 38, and middle parts of the infe
part of BA 4), adjacent premotor, PM (part of BA 6) and prefrontal, PF (parts of BA 8/9/46
dorsal parts of the middle, frontal gyri. (C) Architecture of the model used for simulating
correspond to cortical areas (as indicated by colour code): primary motor (M1), premo
perceptual association (PA) areas. All between-areas connections realised are based on k
the model. Each area consists of two layers of 25  25 excitatory (upper) and inhibitory (
area connections (green and purple) are sparse, random and topographic (not illustrated)
excitatory links (in grey) to and from e are limited to a local (19  19) neighbourhood (li
by underlying cell ‘‘i’’, which receives input from a 5  5 neighbourhood (dark-coloured a
Each pair (e,i) of cells represents clusters of pyramidal cells and interneurons within the
(Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998)).In the language domain, an approach frequently adopted to
investigate the origins of spontaneous, internally driven activation
of thoughts involves the use of ‘‘underdetermined’’ tasks, requiring
participants to choose and verbalize one amongst a set of possible
candidate concepts previously primed within the semantic system.
Similarly to the studies on speech-elicited RP, these tasks (e.g., verb
generation, sentence completion, word generation) have been
found to reliably activate the left inferior prefrontal cortex (Broca’s
area), but, in addition, posterior–superior temporal cortex (Wer-
nicke’s area) (Raichle et al., 1994; Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito,s modelled. Areas relevant for learning the associations between (A) articulatory
ann Area 41), auditory belt, labelled AB (BA 42) and parabelt, PB (BA 22), primary
ntal, or PF (BA 45) cortex – and (B) visual stimuli and hand motor actions: primary
e, BA 18/19, and posterior parts of the middle and inferior temporal gyri, BA 37) and
rior and middle temporal gyri, BA 20/21) areas, and, primary motor, M1 (dorsolateral
) cortices, with M1, PM and PF limited to the most lateral parts of the superior, and
learning of sensorimotor associations and their spontaneous activation. Model areas
tor (PM), prefrontal (PF), and primary perceptual (P1), higher perceptual (HP) and
nown neuroanatomical links. (D) Structure of, and connectivity between, 3 areas of
lower) graded-response leaky integrator cells exhibiting neuronal fatigue. Between-
. (E) Illustration of connectivity of a single excitatory cell (labelled ‘‘e’’). Within-area
ght-coloured area). Mutual inhibition between e and its neighbours is implemented
rea) and projects back to e, inhibiting it (e’s neighbours are similarly inhibited by e).
same cortical column of approximately 0.25 mm2 size (containing 25,000 neurons
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wards et al., 2010)) depicts an example of cortical activation occur-
ring shortly before speech production in a verb generation task.
Readiness-potential and verb-generation tasks fail to capture all
the characteristics of entirely ‘‘free’’ decisions, focussing in one case
on the timepoint of the action decision and in the other on the selec-
tion decision among stimulus-related alternatives. However, they
provideconvergingevidenceon thebrainbasis of theaspects ofdeci-
sionprocesses theymonitor: inferiorprefrontal andposterior–supe-
rior temporal areas are involved ﬁrst when speech-action decisions
are taken, while dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is the earliest site of
hand-related action thought emergence. Nevertheless, neither verb
generation nor RP studies have so far provided amechanistic expla-
nation of how, at the level of cortical circuits, an intention to act
might actually emerge, or addressed the question ofwhy such spon-
taneousprocesses originatewithin theprefrontal and ‘‘higher’’ asso-
ciation areas identiﬁed (and not, e.g., in primarymotor areas, which
control the respective movements).
To address these issues, we simulated learning and spontaneous
emergence of action thoughts in a neural-network model that clo-
sely replicates neurophysiology, structure and connectivity of rele-
vant primary sensorimotor, secondary, and higher association
areas in the frontal and temporal cortex (see Fig. 1, panels A–C).
By ‘‘action thought’’ here we mean the activation (‘‘ignition’’) of a
circuit of strongly and reciprocally connected cells binding to-
gether perception and action patterns, referred to as cell assembly
(CA) (Hebb, 1949). Our previous studies have demonstrated that
CAs can emerge in multi-area networks by means of purely Heb-
bian learning mechanisms and, once developed, behave as non-lin-
ear functional units with two stable states (‘‘on’’ and ‘‘off’’), which
become fully active (‘‘on’’) whenever a critical amount of activation
– conveyed by external or internal input – is present in their cir-
cuits (Garagnani, Wennekers, & Pulvermüller, 2008). Given that
CAs are perception–action circuits associating sensory and motor
neural patterns that are re-activated when the CA ignites, here
we take full CA activation to be the model-correlate of the con-
scious perception of an action thought.
To simulate non-stimulus driven, endogenous perception–ac-
tion CA circuit ignition in the relevant sensorimotor systems we
took a network mimicking structure and connectivity of these sys-
tems (see Fig. 1C–E) and in which such circuits had previously
formed as a result of Hebbian learning and sensory-motor stimula-
tion (Garagnani et al., 2008), and recorded its spontaneous activity
in absence of any input, while activity was driven purely by noise
(simulating spontaneous neuronal ﬁring). All structural and func-
tional properties of the model reproduce connectivity features
and cellular-level phenomena that have been observed pervasively
in the cortex, including local (lateral) inhibition, patchy, sparse and
topographical connectivity (Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998; Kaas,
1997), activation spreading and summation, noise, and long-term
synaptic plasticity (Malenka & Bear, 2004). Solely on the basis of
these neurobiological principles and anatomical constraints theFig. 2. Example of cortical activation during a verb generation task. Topographies of
high-gamma (70–160 Hz) analytical amplitude of the electro-corticogram of an
epileptic patient showing sequential activation in prefrontal (left) and motor (right)
areas shortly before production (at 780 and 100 ms pre-response) of an appropriate
verb in response to auditory presentation of a noun (adapted from (Edwards et al.,
2010), their Fig. 3).model provides a mechanistic explanation of why intentions to
act preferentially originate from a speciﬁc set of brain areas.
A number of computational models of decision making and ac-
tion selection in the human brain has been proposed in the past (Bo-
gacz & Gurney, 2007; Botvinick & Plaut, 2004; Frank & Claus, 2006;
Pfeiffer, Nessler, Douglas, & Maass, 2010; Simen, Cohen, & Holmes,
2006; Usher & McClelland, 2001). None of these, however, has fo-
cussed on the spontaneous emergence of stimulus-independent,
voluntary action, or on explaining the characteristic topography of
the cortical sources believed to underlie this process. Most relevant
here is the ground-breakingwork byDeco and collaborators (Deco&
Rolls, 2005, 2006; Deco, Rolls, & Romo, 2009; Deco, Scarano, & Soto-
Faraco, 2007; Rolls, Grabenhorst, & Deco, 2010a, 2010b), who inves-
tigated attractor networks of interacting integrate-and-ﬁre neurons
exhibiting the ability to spontaneously ‘‘jump’’ out of a resting state
intooneof twohighﬁring-rate stable states as a result of background
noise and sensory ‘‘bias’’. Thiswork speaksdirectly to cognitive-psy-
chological proposals about decision generation based on probabilis-
tic biased-competition models (Duncan, 1980) of decision making.
The neural-networks described therein, however, do not attempt
to replicate in details the connectivity features of the modelled pri-
mary sensory and motor, and higher, cortical areas (e.g., the sparse
andpatchy connections typical of the cortex). Indeed,while this pio-
neering work well illustrates the principles and stochastic mecha-
nisms that may underlie decision-making in the human brain, it
cannot (and, we believe, was not meant to) explain the cortical
topography revealed by the neuroimaging and neurophysiological
experiments on volitional action initiation reviewed earlier, object
of the present study.
2. Materials and methods
In this work, we take the basic building blocks of internal cog-
nitive representations to consist of widely distributed networks
of strongly connected neurons, referred to as cell assemblies (CAs)
(Braitenberg, 1978; Hebb, 1949; Palm, 1982). CAs constitute
‘‘memory circuits’’ that bind together frequently co-occurring per-
ception and action activation patterns (Fuster, 2006) and which
gradually emerge in the cortex as a result of experience, by means
of Hebbian associative learning mechanisms. More precisely, re-
peated co-activation of speciﬁc sets of neurons in primary sensory
and motor cortices leads to the strengthening of the synaptic links
between them, and to the formation of perception–action circuits
distributed over sensory, motor and mediating ‘‘higher’’ areas (Fus-
ter, 2001, 2003). Note that, in the present approach, the intrinsic
connectivity between relevant sensory, motor, and related higher
cortical areas (discussed below) is key to the formation (and hence
distribution) of CAs.
2.1. Structure and function of the relevant brain areas
In viewof the experimental studies reviewed in the Introduction,
we focusonmodellingCAemergenceandspontaneousCAactivation
dynamics in two speciﬁc sensorimotor brain systems, namely:
(A) the left perisylvian areas in the superior temporal and infe-
rior frontal gyri (Fig. 1A), involved in (and repeatedly co-
activated during) early stages of language acquisition and
spoken language processing (Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, &
Rizzolatti, 2002; Fry, 1966; Pulvermüller, 1992, 1999;
Zatorre, Meyer, Gjedde, & Evans, 1996), and
(B) the left ventral visual ‘‘what’’-system and the motor system
(Fig. 1B) relevant for processing, respectively, visual object
identity (Ungerleider & Haxby, 1994; Ungerleider & Mishkin,
1982) and manual actions (Deiber et al., 1991; Dum & Strick,
2002, 2005; Lu, Preston, & Strick, 1994).
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areas of left perisylvian system (A) include: (i) reciprocal links be-
tween cortically adjacent areas in both the superior temporal (BA
41, 42, 22)(Kaas & Hackett, 2000; Pandya, 1995; Rauschecker &
Tian, 2000) and inferior-frontal (ventral BA 4, 6/44, 45/46) gyri
(Pandya & Yeterian, 1985; Young, Scannell, & Burns, 1995; Young,
Scannell, Burns, & Blakemore, 1994) (see also (Pulvermüller,
1992)), (ii) long-distance cortico-cortical connections bridging
inferior prefrontal (BA 45) and posterior–superior temporal (BA
22) areas (i.e., PF and PB in Fig. 1A) mainly via the arcuate fascicle
and the extreme capsule (Catani, Jones, & Ffytche, 2005; Makris &
Pandya, 2009; Makris et al., 1999; Parker et al., 2005; Petrides &
Pandya, 2001; Romanski et al., 1999b), and (iii) ‘‘jumping’’ links
(i.e., between areas that are not adjacent in the model – see purple
arrows in Fig. 1C), consisting of long-distance cortico-cortical con-
nections reciprocally linking auditory parabelt (BA 22) with pre-
motor (BA 6/44) (Glasser & Rilling, 2008; Saur et al., 2008, 2010)
and belt (BA 42) with prefrontal (BA 45) (Kaas & Hackett, 2000;
Petrides & Pandya, 2009; Romanski, Bates, & Goldman-Rakic,
1999a) areas, as well as non-adjacent areas in superior-temporal
(BA 41 with BA 22) and inferior-frontal (BA 45 with BA 4) (Pandya
& Yeterian, 1985; Young et al., 1994) gyri.1
In the frontal lobe (refer to system (B), red-shaded areas in
Fig. 1B), the hand/arm motor area M1 (in BA 4), adjacent PM (BA
6) and more rostral PF (BA 8/9/46) areas are reciprocally connected
(Arikuni, Watanabe, & Kubota, 1988; Dum & Strick, 2002, 2005; Lu
et al., 1994; Pandya & Yeterian, 1985; Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001),
with cortico-cortical links documented between PF and M1 (Guye
et al., 2003; Young et al., 1995). The primary visual, V1 (BA 17),
temporo-occipital, TO (occipital lobe, inferior parts of BA 18/19,
and posterior parts of the inferior and middle temporal gyri, BA
37) and anterior-temporal, AT (temporal pole, BA 38, and middle
parts of the middle and inferior temporal gyri, BA 20/21) areas of
the same system (B) (Fig. 1B, blue-shaded areas) are reciprocally
connected (Distler, Boussaoud, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1993;
Nakamura, Gattass, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1993). Direct (jump-
ing) links from V1 to anterior temporal (AT) regions via the inferior
longitudinal fascicle have also been documented (Catani, Jones,
Donato, & Ffytche, 2003; Wakana, Jiang, Nagae-Poetscher, van Zijl,
& Mori, 2004). Neuroanatomical (Ungerleider, Gaffan, & Pelak,
1989; Webster, Bachevalier, & Ungerleider, 1994), inactivation
(Bauer & Fuster, 1976; Chafee & Goldman-Rakic, 2000; Fuster, Bau-
er, & Jervey, 1985) and lesion (Eacott & Gaffan, 1992; Parker & Gaf-
fan, 1998a, 1998b) studies in the monkey indicate the presence of
direct connections (via the uncinate fascicle) also between ante-
rior-temporal and prefrontal cortices (AT and PF in Fig. 1B). Evi-
dence suggests the presence of direct links (via the external
capsule) also between temporo-occipital (TO) and prefrontal areas
(PF) (Makris & Pandya, 2009; Pandya & Barnes, 1987; Seltzer &
Pandya, 1989) and between anterior/middle temporal (AT) and
premotor (PM) areas (Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001).
In the perisylvian system (A), correlated auditory-articulatory
activity in inferior motor cortex (articulator representation) and
consequent auditory-evoked superior temporal area activity leads,
in presence of Hebbian learning mechanisms, to linkage of word-
articulation neural patterns with their corresponding acoustic–
phonetic patterns (Fadiga et al., 2002; Pulvermüller, 1999, 2001;
Watkins, Strafella, & Paus, 2003;Wilson, Saygin, Sereno, & Iacobon-
i, 2004; Zatorre et al., 1996) (see (Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010) for
a review). Similarly, Hebbian mechanisms acting in system (B) sup-
port the development of CAs linking visual stimuli to hand/arm1 Note that some of the non-jumping links in the model (green arrows in Fig. 1C)
represent long-distance cortico-cortical connections: namely, those between areas PA
and PF, which are adjacent in the model but always represent areas that are not so in
neuroanatomical terms.movements, as required, for example, to pair up visual identity of
objects with associated reaching and grasping actions (Arbib,
1981; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Grafton, Fadiga,
Arbib, & Rizzolatti, 1997; Grezes & Decety, 2002), or, more gener-
ally, to acquire conditional visuomotor associations arbitrarily
mapping visual features of objects to speciﬁc actions (Eacott & Gaf-
fan, 1992; Muhammad, Wallis, & Miller, 2006; Toni, Rushworth, &
Passingham, 2001; White & Wise, 1999).
2.2. Structure and function of the model
Because systems (A) and (B) exhibit analogous structure and
high-level connectivity (see above and Fig. 1A and B), the same net-
work architecture can be used to model both. This is possible be-
cause the local connection structures implemented in the model
reﬂect connectivity features that are shared by sensory and motor
systems of the mammalian brain (Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998;
Douglas & Martin, 2004); moreover, all functional mechanisms
realised at cellular-level (e.g., neuronal adaptation, noise, synaptic
plasticity – see Eqs. (1)–(3), (4.1), (4.2), (5) below) reﬂect neurobio-
logical phenomena that are found pervasively in the cortex (Kan-
del, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000; Rauschecker, 1999). In view of this,
in Fig. 1C we adopt a generic labelling of the model areas, as indi-
cated by the colour code used there.
Each model area consists of two layers of 625 excitatory and
625 inhibitory cells (see Fig. 1D–E)2. Each excitatory cell represents
a cluster of cortical neurons (pyramidal cells), and the underlying
inhibitory cell models the cluster of inhibitory interneurons situated
within the same cortical column (Eggert & van Hemmen, 2000; Wil-
son & Cowan, 1972). The state of each cell x is uniquely deﬁned by its
membrane potential V(x,t), representing the average of the sum of all
(excitatory and inhibitory) postsynaptic potentials acting upon neu-
ral pool (cluster) x at time t, and governed by the following equation:
s  dVðx; tÞ
dt
¼ Vðx; tÞ þ k1ðVInðx; tÞ þ k2gðx; tÞÞ ð1Þ
where VIn(x,t) is the net input to cell x at time t (sum of all inhibitory
and excitatory postsynaptic potentials – I/EPSPs; inhibitory syn-
apses are given a negative sign – plus a constant ‘‘baseline’’ term
Vb), s is the membrane’s time constant, k1, k2 are scaling constants
and g(x,t) is a white noise process with uniform distribution over
[0.5,0.5].3 Time is in arbitrary units. Cells produce a graded re-
sponse that represents the average ﬁring rate of the neuronal cluster
they model; in particular the output (transformation function) of an
excitatory cell x at time t is:
Oðx; tÞ ¼
0 if Vðx; tÞ  u
ðVðx; tÞ uÞ if 0 < ðVðx; tÞ uÞ  1
1 otherwise
8><
>:
ð2Þ
O(x,t) represents the average ﬁring rate (number of action
potentials per time unit) of cluster x at time t; it is a piecewise-lin-
ear sigmoid function of the cell’s membrane potential V(x,t),
clipped into the range [0,1] and with slope 1 between the lower
and upper thresholds u and u + 1. The output O(x,t) of an inhibi-
tory cell is 0 if V(x,t) < 0, and V(x,t) otherwise. In excitatory cells,
the value of the threshold u in Eq. (2) varies in time, tracking the
recent mean activity of the cell so as to implement a simple version
of neuronal adaptation (Kandel et al., 2000) (higher activity leads
to a higher threshold). More precisely:The choice of the number of cells per area is arbitrary and based on empirical
evidence: 25-by-25 turns out to be a good compromise between complexity of the
system (needed to simulate a sufﬁciently rich variety of the phenomenon of interest)
and total number of cells in the network.
3 Inhibitory cells have k2 = 0 (i.e., the neuronal noise is generated just by the
excitatory cells).
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the ‘‘adaptation strength’’ (see Appendix A for the exact parameter
values used in the simulations).
For an excitatory cell x, the approximate time-average x(x,t) of
its output O(x,t) is estimated by integrating the linear differential
equation Eq. (4.1) below with time constant sA, assuming initial
average x(x,0) = 0:sA  dxðx; tÞdt ¼ xðx; tÞ þ Oðx; tÞ ð4:1Þ
Local (lateral) inhibitory connections (see Fig. 1E) and area-spe-
ciﬁc inhibition are also implemented, realising, respectively, local
and global competition mechanisms (Duncan, 2006) and prevent-
ing activation from falling into non-physiological states (Braiten-
berg & Schüz, 1998). More formally, in Eq. (1) the input VIn(x,t) to
each excitatory cell of the same area includes an area-speciﬁc
(‘‘global’’) inhibition term kSxS(x,t), which is subtracted from the
total sum of the I/EPSPs postsynaptic potentials VIn in input to
the cell, with xS(x,t) deﬁned by:4 A cell x is ‘‘activated’’ by adding the value of 1.0 to the sum of all I/EPSPs that its
membrane is receiving in input at that time (i.e., to the term VIn(x,t) in Eq. (1)). This
quickly drives the cell’s membrane potential V(x) – and, hence, its output O(x); see Eq.
(2) – towards saturation (i.e., 1.0).
5 On the basis of previous data (Garagnani et al., 2008), 1 simulation time-step cansS  dxsðx; tÞdt ¼ xsðx; tÞ þ
X
x2area
Oðx; tÞ ð4:2Þ
The low-pass dynamics of the cells (Eqs. 1, 2, 4.1, 4.2) are inte-
grated using the Euler scheme with step size Dt, where Dt = 0.5 (in
arbitrary time units).
Excitatory links within and between (possibly non-adjacent)
model areas are random and limited to a local (topographic) neigh-
bourhood; weights are initialised at random, in the range ]0, 0.1].
The probability of a synapse to be created between any two cells
falls off with their distance (Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998) according
to a Gaussian function clipped to 0 outside the chosen neighbour-
hood (a square of size n = 19 for excitatory and n = 5 for inhibitory
cell projections). This produces a sparse, patchy and topographic
connectivity, as typically found in the mammalian cortex (Amir,
Harel, & Malach, 1993; Braitenberg & Schüz, 1998; Douglas & Mar-
tin, 2004; Kaas, 1997).
The Hebbian learning mechanism implemented simulates well-
documented synaptic plasticity phenomena of long-term potentia-
tion (LTP) and depression (LTD), believed to play a key role in expe-
rience-dependent plasticity, memory and learning (Malenka &
Bear, 2004; Rioult-Pedotti, Friedman, & Donoghue, 2000). In partic-
ular, the learning rule is an implementation of the Artola–Bröcher–
Singer model of LTP/LTD (Artola, Bröcher, & Singer, 1990; Artola &
Singer, 1993). In the model, we discretized the continuous range of
possible synaptic efﬁcacy changes into two possible levels, +Dw
and Dw (withDw << 1 and ﬁxed). We deﬁned as ‘‘active’’ any link
from an excitatory cell x such that the output O(x,t) of cell x at time
t is larger than hpre, where hpre 2 ]0,1] is an arbitrary threshold rep-
resenting the minimum level of presynaptic activity required for
LTP (or LTD) to occur. Thus, given any two cells x and y connected
by a synaptic link with weight wt(x,y), the new weight wt+1(x,y) is
calculated as follows:be considered equivalent to 20 ms.
6 As a cell activated by an external input is given an additional EPSP signal of
amplitude 1.0, it is possible to compare directly the amplitude of the noise to that of
driven activity. In fact, we know that mean and variance of the noise process g are
lg = 0 and r2g ¼ ð0:5=
p
3Þ2 , respectively. If we take the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) to
be the ratio of the signal’s mean to the standard deviation of the noise, the SNR of the
input signal to a cell which is being excited by an external stimulus is:SNR = (lsignal/
rnoise) = 1/rg = 2
p
3  3.5.
7 By ‘‘CA cells’’ we mean cells that belong to a cell assembly (CA) circuit (i.e., cells
that, by means of Hebbian learning, have become strongly and reciprocally linked to
other cells, forming such a circuit).wtþ1ðx;yÞ¼
wtðx;yÞþDw ðLTPÞ if Oðx;tÞ hpre and Vðy;tÞ hþ
wtðx;yÞDw ðLTDÞ if Oðx;tÞ hpre and h Vðy;tÞ< hþ
wtðx;yÞDw ðLTDÞ if Oðx;tÞ< hpre and Vðy;tÞ hþ
wtðx;yÞ ðno changeÞ otherwise
8>><
>>:
ð5Þ
Speciﬁc parameter values used in the simulations are provided
in Appendix A.2.3. Materials
We built a set of 12 to-be-memorised sensorimotor pattern
pairs; each pattern pair consists of two (one sensory and one mo-
tor) neural conﬁgurations, identifying 20 cells in area P1 (repre-
senting a perceptual – ‘‘auditory’’ or ‘‘visual’’ – stimulus) and 20
cells in M1 (representing an associated motor – ‘‘articulatory’’ or
‘‘manual’’ – pattern). Note that 20 cells constitute only 3.2% of
the total number of cells of one area. The patterns overlap to a de-
gree, to reproduce the corresponding overlap existing between
motor and perceptual features of real action schemata. We took a
‘‘tabula rasa’’ network (i.e., one in which all links were initialised
at random) having the architecture shown in Fig. 1C, and ‘‘taught’’
it the predeﬁned set of sensory-motor pair associates. More pre-
cisely, the training consisted of presenting each of the 12 pattern
pairs to the network 15,000 times (in random order). Each presen-
tation involved activating4, for 16 simulation time-steps, the cells in
P1 and M1 speciﬁed by one pair, and was followed by an inter-stim-
ulus interval (ISI) of variable length during which spreading of acti-
vation and resultant changes in the synaptic weights (i.e., learning)
took place. As shown in our previous work (Garagnani, Wennekers,
& Pulvermüller, 2007, 2009; Garagnani et al., 2008), this training
process leads to the spontaneous emergence of pair-speciﬁc distrib-
uted sensorimotor cell assembly (CA) circuits in the network, each
CA linking one (and only one) of the twelve P1 patterns to its corre-
sponding pair associate in M1, in such a way that presentation of just
the sensory (or just the motor) component will cause the entire CA
to ‘‘light up’’, leading to the re-activation of the associated pattern
in M1 (or P1).2.4. Operative deﬁnition of CA ignition
To investigate the emergence of spontaneous CA activation in
the network, the model correlate of self-initiated action intentions,
we continuously recorded the activity of a trained network for
20,000 simulation steps (roughly equivalent to 400 s. of real time)5
while its activity was driven solely by uniform noise (i.e., in absence
of any input stimulus). As indicated by Eq. (1), noise is an inherent
property of each model cell, intended to mimic the spontaneous
activity (baseline ﬁring) of real neurons. This is simulated by a white
noise process g (identical for all cells) which, at each time step, gen-
erated – for each different cell – a random number in the interval
[0.5,0.5], with uniform distribution. This value (adequately scaled)
is added to the input VIn (see Eq. (1)) that the cell is currently receiv-
ing from other cells as well as from external stimuli.6 Therefore,
noise was present in all areas and in equal amounts (on average).
Network dynamics were documented by recording (in time and
for each cortical area) the total number of (excitatory) CA cells7
that exhibited output value above a speciﬁed threshold h 2 [0,1].
The threshold h was input- and area-speciﬁc, and deﬁned as follows:
80 M. Garagnani, F. Pulvermüller / Brain & Language 127 (2013) 75–85(i) during training, for each of the 12 input patterns the time-average
of the network response to a pattern was computed by averaging all
the (excitatory) cells’ output over the 15 time-steps that followed
each pattern presentation; (ii) for each pattern w and area A, the
area-speciﬁc threshold h was deﬁned as a given fraction of the max-
imal single-cell’s average response to input w; more formally,
hwðAÞ ¼ c maxx2AOðx; tÞw, where Oðx; tÞw is the average input-spe-
ciﬁc response of cell x to pattern w, and c 2 [0,1] is a constant; (iii)
a cell x in area A was considered part of the CA for w if and only if
it exhibited above-threshold average response to w, i.e., if
Oðx; tÞw  hwðAÞ. As different values of c lead to different CA sizes,
for the statistical analysis of the CA dynamics (see below) we used
c = 0.50; this value was chosen on the basis of simulations with net-
works having a similar architecture to the present one (Garagnani
et al., 2008), showing a relatively invariant CA size for values of c be-
tween .1 and .7.
To study the dynamics of spontaneous CA ignition we identiﬁed
all episodes of CA activation that occurred during the period of
spontaneous network activity recorded. A CA was considered ac-
tive if and only if at least 50% of its cells were ﬁring above thresh-
old h (where h was area- and pattern-speciﬁc, as just described).Fig. 3. Spontaneous CA ignition. Consecutive snapshots of network activity (from
left to right) taken during a typical episode of spontaneous CA activation (i.e., in
absence of any input stimulus). Each column depicts activity within the network at
a speciﬁc time point. Within a column, each square illustrates activity within a
speciﬁc area; within each area, one ‘‘dot’’, or pixel, corresponds to an excitatory cell.
Brighter pixels indicate cells exhibiting higher ﬁring rates. Preliminary traces of
reverberant activity within CA circuits in areas PF and PA can be visually identiﬁed
already at time 4; from there, CA ignition appears to gradually spread to
secondary, and then primary, areas.2.5. Analysis of ignition dynamics
Using the deﬁnition (iii) given in the previous section we mea-
sured average CA size (number of CA cells) per cortical area across
different values of c (c = .01, .02, .04, .05, .1, .2, .4, .5). This was done
in order to control for any scaling effects (introduced by the pres-
ence of different numbers of CA cells in different areas) which may
confound the results, and to be able to reveal true effects of area on
the spontaneous CA activation dynamics.
The average time-course of spontaneous ignition of each CA
(hereafter called ‘‘average spontaneous ignition’’, ASI) was ob-
tained by averaging together all events (‘‘trials’’) of spontaneous
activation of the same CA. A trial was 40 time-steps long, starting
10 steps before spontaneous CA activation time (the earliest time-
step of the ignition episode at which the CA was active, as deﬁned
earlier). For each CA, we computed six different area-speciﬁc ASIs.
Only and all those CAs which spontaneously ignited at least once
during the recorded time (11 out of the 12 learnt) were used in
the analysis. For each area, we computed and plotted the average
number of CA cells active above threshold by averaging over the
11 different ASIs. We also computed the normalised ASIs – ob-
tained by dividing each (area-speciﬁc) ASI by the respective CA size
in that area – and their average, thus obtaining the average fraction
(%) of active CA cells per cortical area. To statistically test for the
presence of different spontaneous ignition time-courses in differ-
ent cortical areas, we investigated more closely the CA dynamics
during a critical 6-step-long time window with origin (time 0)
set to the last step at which the average number of active CA cells
was still zero (baseline) in all areas. For this interval, we extracted
the area-speciﬁc activation data from the 11 (normalised) ASIs and
subjected these values to repeated-measure analyses of variance
(ANOVAs). More precisely, for each of the six time-steps of interest
we ran a separate 2-way ANOVA with factors ‘‘centrality’’ (3 levels;
primary = {P1, M1}, secondary = {HP, PM}, and central = {PA, PF})
and ‘‘frontality’’ (2 levels; posterior = {P1, HP, PA}, anterior: = {M1,
PM, PF}). Note that this nomenclature, used in the remainder of
the paper, takes a model-centred (as opposed to brain-centred)
view, in that areas that appear in the periphery of the network
(i.e., primary sensory, P1, and motor, M1 – see Fig. 1C) are deﬁned
here as ‘‘peripheral’’, and areas that occupy the centre of the archi-
tecture (i.e., PA, PF) are referred to as ‘‘central’’ (in spite of the cor-
responding cortices being localised most laterally and anteriorly in
neuroanatomical terms).3. Results
During the recorded period of activity (20,000 simulation steps)
we observed 197 episodes of spontaneous action-thought circuit
ignition, involving 11 different CAs, which activated in random or-
der (the remaining one CA was not observed to ignite spontane-
ously). Each CA activation was followed by a (spontaneous) de-
activation, an effect brought about by the network self-regulation
mechanisms (global and local inhibition). Visual inspection of
these episodes (e.g., see Fig. 3) suggested that the very ﬁrst traces
of spontaneous reverberant activity within CA cells (CA ignition)
emerged preferentially in the ‘‘central’’ areas of the network (PF,
PA), corresponding to prefrontal and higher-association cortices
in temporal areas, subsequently spreading ‘‘outwards’’ as a cascade
of activations proceeding from ‘‘central’’ to secondary (or premo-
tor) and from secondary to primary (motor and sensory) areas.
Average CA size (number of CA cells per area) was 15.4 (P1),
25.1 (HP), 28.4 (PA), 28.5 (PF), 25.8 (PM), 14.9 (M1), indicating a
symmetrical distribution of CA-cells around the ‘‘centre’’ of the
network, with larger numbers in central than in secondary – and
in secondary than in primary – areas. The overall time-course of
spontaneous CA activation for the different areas is illustrated in
Fig. 4. The graphs plot the area-speciﬁc numbers of active CA cells
(top: absolute values; bottom: normalised values) against simula-
tion time. All areas exhibit similar proﬁles, with spontaneous CA
activation consisting of three main phases: ignition (time-step
5 to about 5), sustained reverberant activity (from steps 6–7 to
15) and deactivation (from 15 to 30). However, different areas
exhibit different numbers of active CA cells during the sustained
period, with the two central areas (PA, PF) showing the largest
numbers, followed by the two secondary (HP, PM) and two pri-
mary ones (P1, M1). This result is a consequence of the cortical dis-
tribution of CA cells, described above.
Although the top-left inset of Fig. 4 suggests that CA activity
develops ﬁrst in central areas, this effect could be entirely ex-
plained by the larger number of CA cells in these areas. To remove
this confound, data were normalised, i.e., divided by area-speciﬁc
CA size. Even after normalisation (lower plots of Fig. 4), areas PA
and PF still appear to exhibit above-baseline CA activity before
Fig. 4. Dynamics of spontaneous CA activation. Right: Time-courses of area-speciﬁc
average CA activations for the six different cortical areas modelled. Left insets:
dynamics of the ﬁrst few time steps of spontaneous CA ignition. Note the earlier
(time-step 1) rise of CA activity in the two central areas (PA, PF: purple and cyan
curves), followed by secondary (HP, PM: step 2) and primary (P1, M1: step 3) areas.
Top: CA activation quantiﬁed as total number of active CA cells per area. Central
areas exhibit larger numbers of active CA cells than secondary and primary ones
due to CA distribution. Bottom: normalised CA activation data (to remove the
confounding effects of CA size, top graphs values are divided by area-speciﬁc CA
size). While the maximal CA activation levels are now comparable (right), the two
central areas still exhibit earlier activation than secondary and primary areas (left).
Fig. 5. Dynamics of early spontaneous CA ignition. Average portion (%) of CA
activation per pairs of cortical areas (Primary = P1, M1; Secondary = PA, PM;
Central = HP, PF) during the initial six time-steps. Error bars indicate standard error.
Main plots: activity reaches signiﬁcance ﬁrst in the central areas (time 1), when
secondary areas still exhibit only baseline activity. Secondary areas are ﬁrst active
at time 2, followed by primary areas at time 3. Note the different scales used for the
leftmost (times 1–2), middle (3–4) and rightmost (5–6) pairs of plots. Inset: results
obtained after removing the ‘‘jumping’’ links (purple arrows in Fig. 1C) from the
model. Note that central and secondary areas still become active before primary
ones (time-step 1), but, unlike in the ‘‘fully connected’’ model, their activations no
longer differ during any of the early CA ignition steps.
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primary (step 3) areas. The distribution of CA neurons over the dif-
ferent areas is therefore insufﬁcient to explain the early emergence
of CA activation in the central areas.
The statistical analysis fully conﬁrmed these observations. Each
of the ﬁve ANOVAs that we ran on the normalised data from time-
steps 1 to 5 revealed a main effect of centrality (F-values ranged
from a minimum of F(1,10) = 5.12 at time 1 (p < .05) to a maximum
of F(2,20) = 79.1 (p < .00001) at time 4), conﬁrming stronger activ-
ity in the central than in the secondary areas already at time 1.
Fig. 5 plots the normalised data for the critical time-steps only
(time steps 0–5) after grouping them by centrality level (i.e., col-
lapsing data within each pair of primary, secondary, and central
areas). Planned comparisons conﬁrmed that CA activation reaches
signiﬁcance ﬁrst in the central areas (PF, PA) at time-step 1
(F(1,10) = 6.37, p < .05), when secondary areas are not yet above
baseline (F(1,10) = 1.2, p>.2). These become active later, at time-
step 2 (F(1,10) = 43.1, p < .0001), while activation in primary areas
reaches signiﬁcance last, at time-step 3 (F(1,10) = 10.6, p < .01). As
highlighted in the bar plot, central areas are less active than sec-
ondary ones during time-steps 1–3 (F-values in the range
F(1,10) = 5.12 (p < .05) to F(1,10) = 16.7 (p < .005)); similarly, pri-
mary are less active than secondary areas between time-steps 2
and 5 (F-values from F(1,10) = 16.0, p < .005, to F(1,10) = 226.7,
p < .000001).
In a further simulation, we repeated the above experiment after
removing all the between-area ‘‘jumping’’ links (purple arrows in
Fig. 1C) from the model. As before, we observed spontaneous CA
ignitions occur in the network (although only 6 of the 12 learnt
CAs ignited). Data from this simulation are plotted in Fig. 5, top-left
inset. Planned comparisons indicate that, in the altered network,
ignition begins both in central and secondary areas: both of these
are active at time step 1 (F(1,5) = 7.58, p < .02 and F(1,5) = 22.73,
p < .0005), when activation in primary areas is still not signiﬁcant(F(1,5) = 1, p > .1). Primary areas become active only at time step
5 (F(1,5) = 3.79, p < .05). Activations in secondary and central areas
do not differ during time-steps 0, 1 or 2 (F(1,5) = 1.57 (p > .2),
F(1,5) = 0.49 (p > .5), and F(1,5) = 3.31 (p > .1), respectively). More-
over, activity in both secondary and central areas is stronger than
in primary ones already at time-step 2 (F(1,5) = 8.68, p < .02, and
F(1,5) = 22.9, p < .0005, respectively). Finally, in one last simulation
we repeated the same experiment after removing the spontaneous
neuronal ﬁring (i.e., after setting the noise parameter k2 in Eq. (1)
to 0): in this case, no episodes of spontaneous CA ignition were ob-
served during the recorded time. These results demonstrate that
noise (understood as spontaneous ﬁring) and connection structure
critically determine the locus where activation signs emerge ﬁrst.4. Discussion
We used a neural-network model of primary sensorimotor, sec-
ondary, and ‘‘higher’’ association areas in the frontal and temporal
lobes to simulate the cortical processes underlying the emergence
of action intentions and decisions in the human brain. The model’s
behaviour replicates and explains the patterns of activation ob-
served in the brain shortly before initiation of voluntary move-
ment. The ignition of sensorimotor circuits (cell assemblies, CAs)
preferentially begins within the model’s higher- association (pre-
frontal) areas, by way of the spontaneous reverberation of baseline
neuronal activity (noise) within the positive-feedback cortical
loops that form the CA. Through the CA’s potentiated synapses
(which emerged spontaneously, as a result of sensorimotor learn-
ing) reverberant activity quickly spreads from prefrontal to premo-
tor areas, reaching the primary motor cortices last, just as observed
in Bereitschaftspotential experiments investigating the cortical
sources underlying voluntary initiation of manual action (Haggard,
2008). In parallel to this sequence of rostro-caudal activations in
the frontal lobe, the model exhibits a similar pattern in the tempo-
ral lobe, proceeding from polymodal/higher-association areas (pos-
terior–superior or anterior temporal areas, labelled PA in Fig. 1) to
secondary (HP), and then to primary (visual or auditory) cortices
(P1). Thus, the simulated cortical sources underlying voluntary
speech originate simultaneously from inferior prefrontal (Broca’s)
and superior temporal (Wernicke’s) areas, subsequently spreading
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tory areas. This reproduces the pattern of neurophysiological activ-
ity observed experimentally in tasks where subjects have to
generate words, including classic verb generation, sentence com-
pletion and auditory verbal imagery tasks (Raichle et al., 1994;
Thompson-Schill, D’Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997; Wise et al.,
1991) (e.g., see Fig. 1).
These results mechanistically explain the origins and cortical
topography of the neural processes underlying endogenously gen-
erated intentions and decisions to act in terms of spontaneous,
noise-driven ignition of distributed long-term perception–action
memory circuits. These ignitions started gradually, with very low
– although signiﬁcantly above baseline – activation values, a stage
that we interpret as the model correlate of the (pre-conscious) for-
mation of an initial action intention, or preparation (time-steps
0–2). As soon as activation in a perception-action circuit over-
comes the ‘‘ignition threshold’’, it then grows very rapidly, almost
‘‘explosively’’ (time-steps 3–5), outperforming (and suppressing)
all its competitor circuits; this can be seen as reﬂecting a choice,
or decision, being made between potential alternatives. Note that
this account ﬁts very well with recent experimental evidence indi-
cating that decision outcomes of self-initiated actions are already
encoded in patterns of brain activity and neuronal ﬁring several
seconds (up to 10) before they enter awareness (Fried, Mukamel,
& Kreiman, 2011; Soon, Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008).
The earliest precursors of, and steepest, activation increases
during spontaneous ignitions of perception–action circuits were
present within what we refer to as ‘‘central’’, or higher-association,
areas. This local speciﬁcity is a direct consequence of the (i) intrin-
sic network connectivity, and the (ii) neurobiological mechanisms
(long-term synaptic plasticity, spreading and reverberation of acti-
vation) that constrain the formation of such circuits and determine
the way in which activation propagates within them. To see the
relevance of the network’s structure, ﬁrst note that the number
of areas projecting to (or receiving projections from) central re-
gions of the model (areas PA, PF) is larger than that for secondary
– and primary – ones (see Fig. 1C: each of the central areas is recip-
rocally linked to four other areas, whereas secondary ones to three,
and primary areas to only two). Because at the start of the simula-
tions between-area synaptic links are instantiated at random using
the same probability distribution for each pair of areas, neurons in
central areas will end up with higher numbers of incoming/outgo-
ing between-area links than cells in secondary (or primary) areas
(on average, 4:3:2 ratios for central:secondary:primary, respec-
tively). During training, Hebbian learning acts uniformly across
the network, potentiating synapses between any two simulta-
neously active connected cells. Other things being equal, cells with
larger numbers of between-area synaptic links are more likely than
others to have such links potentiated. Thus, although learning is
driven by concomitant activation of peripheral (primary sensory
and motor) areas, it is the cells in central ones that are more likely
to become the constituents of the strongly linked, distributed sen-
sorimotor circuits. This is conﬁrmed by the results, which indicate
that more CA cells spontaneously emerged in central than in sec-
ondary – and more in secondary than in primary – areas, reﬂecting
the corresponding distribution of the per-area number of ‘‘cortico-
cortical’’ (between-area) links. As spontaneous CA ignition is
caused by accumulation and reverberation of noise (spontaneous
neuronal ﬁring) within the positive-feedback loops that form the
CA circuits, and because more between-area potentiated links exist
in central than in other areas, under uniform noise, within-CA
reverberatory activity is more likely to occur in central than in
other areas. (Note that the lead role of higher areas was conﬁrmed
even after normalising data for the number of CA cells per area,
removing the possibility that the observed phenomena be simply
a result of scaling effects.)The validity of the above explanatory account is backed by two
results obtained from additional simulations: ﬁrst, the observation
that, in absence of spontaneous neuronal ﬁring (noise), no sponta-
neous ignitions occurred during the recorded simulation time
(hence, noise is necessary to induce reverberation in the percep-
tion-action circuits). Second, and most important, the results ob-
tained with a model in which all the ‘‘jumping’’ links (that is,
between second-next neighbour areas – purple arrows in Fig. 1C)
had been removed. In such a ‘‘serially’’ connected network (con-
taining only the green links Fig. 1C), central and secondary areas
have the same average number of incoming/outgoing between-
area links (each of them is linked to two other areas), a number still
larger than that of links to/from primary ones (linked to only one
other area). We found that, during the early ignition steps, central
and secondary areas still became active earlier than primary ones,
but, unlike in the ‘‘fully connected’’ model, their activations no
longer differed (see Fig. 5, inset). In other words, spontaneous CA
ignitions ﬁrst began in central and secondary areas (in equal pro-
portions), while primary areas exhibited signiﬁcant activity only
later, reﬂecting the new distribution of the per-area number of
‘‘cortico-cortical’’ links (2:2:1). This conﬁrms that the underlying
connectivity structure of the model is indeed the factor determin-
ing the locus of the origins of spontaneous action thoughts igni-
tions. In a wider context, these results suggest that the
connection structure of prefrontal and temporal higher association
cortices may be the explanatory variable of the most intriguing
cognitive functions of these regions.
We do not wish to claim here that human volition is just the
result of the accumulation of neuronal noise within strongly
linked sensorimotor circuits. Other mechanisms are certainly
necessary to identify which sets of perception–action associa-
tions are relevant to the current stimulus, goal or behaviour,
and hence are allowed to become active. However, if the decision
of when to act, or of which action to execute out of a set of suit-
able candidates, is not stimulus driven but ‘‘free’’ and uncon-
strained, we suggest that the gradual, spontaneous build up of
reverberant activity within distributed sensorimotor circuits that
compete with each other to reach full activation may represent
an effective way for the cortex to make both decisions in a seem-
ingly random (or at least multiply determined) manner. The
model explains and demonstrates how such decisions can be
made by means of processes which (unlike ‘‘homunculus’’-based
ones) are distributed, require only sub-threshold (or unconscious)
activity, and fall out of well-known neurophysiological principles
(spontaneous ﬁring and activation spreading within circuits of
reinforced synapses).
Although here we focused on modelling cortical structures and
the spontaneous emergence of action intentions within them, we
should note that the basal ganglia and cerebellum also play impor-
tant roles in the preparation and control of action – e.g., (Jueptner
& Weiller, 1998). In fact, the presence in the network of a self-reg-
ulatory system – realised by area-speciﬁc global inhibitory loops
(see Section 2.2) – results in a process of mutual competition be-
tween the different CA circuits (Garagnani et al., 2008), effectively
implementing the action selection functions believed to be medi-
ated by the basal ganglia (Wickens, 1997).
In addition to providing a cortical-level explanation of existing
neurophysiological and neuroimaging data on the emergence of
voluntary action, the model makes a number of testable predic-
tions. First, the model predicts and explains the spontaneous
emergence of perception–action circuits distributed across supe-
rior-temporal and inferior-frontal perisylvian areas and linking
speech sounds with corresponding articulations (see Fig. 1A);
the existence of such action perception circuits in language pro-
cessing has been conﬁrmed by a number of experimental studies
(see (Pulvermüller & Fadiga, 2010) for a recent review). Second,
Eq. (1) Time constant
(for excitatory cells)
s = 2.5 (in simulation
time-steps)
Time constant
(for inhibitory cells)
s = 5
(in simulation time-
steps)
Scaling factor k1 = 0.01
Baseline potential Vb = 10
(during training): Vb = 0
Noise scaling factor k2 = 10
p
48
(during training): k2 = 25
p
48
Global inhibition strength kS = 50
(during training): kS = 95)
Eq. (3) Adaptation a = 0.026
Eq. (4.1) and
(4.2)
Average output time
constant (for adaptation mechanism):
sA = 15
(in simulation time-
steps)
Global inhibition time constant sS = 8 (in simulation
time-steps)
Eq. (5) Postsynaptic potential thresholds for LTP/
LTD:
h = 0.15
h+ = 0.25
Presynaptic output activity required for
any synaptic change:
hpre = 0.05
Learning rate: Dw = 0.0005
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across prefrontal–precentral and temporal areas (see Fig. 1B)
and mapping speciﬁc visual features of objects to speciﬁc manual
actions has (at least) two further implications: (i) the visual pre-
sentation of objects whose features afford (or have been associ-
ated to) speciﬁc hand/arm movements should elicit activation in
prefrontal and premotor areas; and, conversely, (ii) the execution
(or mental simulation) of a manual action that has been associ-
ated to a particular conjuction of visual features or object should
produce, even in absence of the associated visual stimulus, activa-
tion in temporal areas. The former prediction has been conﬁrmed
by behavioural (Craighero, Fadiga, Umilta, & Rizzolatti, 1996;
Tucker & Ellis, 1998), neuroimaging (Grafton et al., 1997; Grezes
& Decety, 2002; Perani et al., 1995) and single cell (Murata
et al., 1997; Rizzolatti & Gentilucci, 1988) studies; the latter,
novel one, still awaits direct experimental validation, although
fMRI and TMS evidence (Cohen, Cross, Tunik, Grafton, & Culham,
2009; Kroliczak, Cavina-Pratesi, Goodman, & Culham, 2007;
Singhal, Kaufman, Valyear, & Culham, 2006) lends some prelimin-
ary support.
A growing body of experimental evidence indicates that the
observation of goal-directed actions involving hand or mouth
movements activates mirror neurons in premotor and parietal re-
gions which are also activated by the execution of the same actions
(Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Riz-
zolatti, 1995; Gallese et al., 1996; Grafton, Arbib, Fadiga, & Rizzol-
atti, 1996; Grafton et al., 1997; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, &
Fogassi, 1996a; Rizzolatti et al., 1996b). Note that mirror neuron
activation during observation of grasping actions is present only
if both acting agent (the hand) and target object are visible, which
implies the active representation of these visual stimuli and,
importantly, of their spatial relationship. This suggests that, in
addition to the temporo-frontal perception–action system mod-
elled here and linking information carried by the ventral visual
stream – speciﬁc to object identity – to concordant actions, a sec-
ond, parallel system of sensorimotor brain regions including the
parietal areas involved in the processing of the dorsal visual stream
(Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) must be acting in concert with the
former to convey visuo-spatial information to hand/arm motor
areas (Arbib, 1997; Sakata, Taira, Kusunoki, Murata, & Tanaka,
1997). Although modelling this second perception–action system
was outside the remits of this work, all neurobiological mecha-
nisms simulated here are found pervasively in the cortex; thus,
we conjecture that processes of spontaneous sensorimotor circuit
emergence and ignition analogous to those simulated in the pres-
ent model of fronto-temporal areas might occur also in a fronto-
parietal (or in any other sensorimotor) system.
Finally, in line with accounts positing the temporary reactiva-
tion of long-term cortical representations as a possible neural basis
for working memory (Baddeley, 2003; D’Esposito, 2007; Zipser, Ke-
hoe, Littlewort, & Fuster, 1993), activation within cells of a CA cir-
cuit persists even after withdrawal of the sensory stimulus that
elicits it. The discovery of memory cells, neurons exhibiting sus-
tained activity during delayed response tasks (Fuster & Jervey,
1982), is consistent with this behaviour, so the model can, in part,
explain the corresponding neurophysiological data. Most impor-
tantly, however, this model is the ﬁrst one to predict that, and ex-
plain why, visuospatial memory cells are found in prefrontal areas
(as well as in inferior temporal cortex), as a range of ﬁne experi-
ments unambiguously demonstrated (Funahashi, Bruce, & Gold-
man-Rakic, 1989; Fuster, 1990; Kojima & Goldman-Rakic, 1982;
Miyashita & Chang, 1988). Note that memory cells have been re-
ported also in primary visual (V1) (Fuster, 1990; Super, Spekreijse,
& Lamme, 2001) and auditory (A1) cortex (Durif, Jouffrais, & Rouil-
ler, 2003; Sakurai, 1994), albeit less frequently there, just as our
model predicts (see also (D’Esposito, 2007)).5. Conclusions
We ﬁnd that the spontaneous emergence of intentions to speak
and perform hand-related actions begins in themost ‘‘central’’ parts
of the network (PF and PA in Fig. 1, themodel correlates of prefrontal
and temporal association cortices) due to the underlying between-
area connectivity. In fact, in virtueof their rich synaptic links to other
areas, these multimodal, higher-association zones (Damasio, 1989)
act as ‘‘cortical hubs’’, linking primary sensory areas to motor ones
and thus supporting the formation of distributed perception–action
circuits through learning. The hub status of these areas means that
their neurons exhibit, on average, a higher number of between-area
(cortico-cortical) synaptic links than cells in primary (or secondary)
areas, and, hence, aremore likely to takepart in the formationof per-
ception-action circuits. Subsequently to such circuit formation, in
absence of any external input, spontaneous build up and reverbera-
tion of noisewithin their potentiated synapses occurs. Because neu-
ronal noise is uniformly distributed in the network, this is more
likely tohappen in central areas (where largernumbersof reinforced
links have emerged) than in primary or secondary ones.
Solely on the basis of Hebbian learning, cortical connectivity,
activation spreading and neuronal noise, our model reproduces
and explains the dynamics and cortical topography of the neural
processes underlying the spontaneous emergence of decisions to
speak and perform manual action. Importantly, the fact that spon-
taneous activity originates within the most ‘‘central’’ parts of the
perception-action circuits mechanistically explains why it is these
more richly connected higher-association areas (e.g., prefrontal
cortex) that spontaneously take the ‘‘lead’’ over other (primary
and secondary) ones, hence naturally becoming the site of pro-
cesses underlying higher cognitive functions, such as planning
and decision making. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes
the ﬁrst mechanistic model of the spontaneous emergence of func-
tional specialisation of brain areas for intentions and decisions,
based exclusively on neurobiological principles, anatomical struc-
ture and sensorimotor experience.
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